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State ownership and banks’ information rents:
Evidence from China
FengyanYu I Qi Liang I Wei Wang
Abstract
In a lending relationship, a bank with an information advantage 
regarding its client tends to hold up the borrower and charge higher 
interest rates. We conjecture that state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
with worse information asymmetry, are subject to greater infor­
mation rents. State-owned banks place less emphasis on informa­
tion production and hence extract lower rents compared to profit­
maximizing private banks. We use the decline of loan interest rates 
around the borrowers’ equity initial public offerings (IPOs) as the 
proxy of banks’ information rents. We find SOEs in China experi­
ence larger declines in loan interest rates around their IPOs; the cen­
tral government-controlled Big Four banks exhibit smaller declines in 
rates they charge, and their rate declines concentrate on loans made 
to SOEs.
KEYWORDS
banking relationship, information rent, IPO, loan interest rate, state 
ownership
1 | INTRODUCTION
The conventional wisdom about lending holds that banks are relationship lenders that acquire proprietary, firm­
specific information about the borrowers through screening and monitoring services to overcome the information 
asymmetry (e.g., Allen, 1990; Diamond, 1984). A dark side of banks’ information production is that it creates an 
information gap between incumbent banks and outside banks. A firm seeking to switch banks may be perceived by 
uninformed outsiders as a “lemon,” regardless of its true financial condition. This gives incumbents monopoly power 
to “hold up” the borrowers and charge high interest rates (Rajan, 1992; Sharpe, 1990), especially when the firm lacks 
nonbank financing alternatives (Wu, Sercu, & Yao, 2009). Recent studies, including Hale and Santos (2009), Schenone 
(2010), and Santos and Winton (2008), using loan data in the United States, provide empirical evidence of banks’ 
information rents.
This paper, focusing on China's banking market where state-owned companies and banks are heavyweight players, 
seeks to understand how state ownership influences banks’ rent extraction in such a market. In the same vein as Hale 
and Santos (2009) and Schenone (2010), we use the borrower firms’ equity initial public offerings (IPOs) as the iden­
tification event to reveal the existence of pre-IPO rents. IPOs disseminate to the public a large amount of information 
about the issuers and, hence, erode incumbent banks’ information advantage, forcing them to lower the loan inter­
est rates. In addition, a firm's equity IPO expands its nonbank financing channels, further dissolving the banks’ holdup 
power and the rents they can charge. Thus, the decline in loan interest rates around IPOs can be interpreted as the 
evidence of pre-IPO information rents.
We postulate that state ownership could impact the information rents in China's credit market due to two features 
of state ownership. First, the objective function of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is not solely profit maximization; 
rather, it has a focus on providing social services (Baumol, 1984). Bai, Lu, and Tao (2006) contend that SOEs in China 
pursue two goals simultaneously: financial profits and social stability. For instance, they tend to avoid firing workers 
even in financial difficulties. This dual-objective problem baffles the efforts to monitor and evaluate SOE performance. 
Second, SOEs are owned by the public but controlled by politicians. The public ownership in SOEs is nontransferable, 
which “inhibits the capitalization of future consequences into current transfer prices, therefore reducing the incentive 
to detect and police managerial behavior” (De Alessi, 1974, p. 646). In addition, politicians have incentives to suppress 
firm-specific information to hide expropriation activities by them and their cronies (Shleifer & Vishney, 1994).
Both the dual objectives and the separation of ownership (the public) and control (politicians) hinder monitoring and 
cause greater information asymmetry in SOEs. Consistent with this, prior research shows that state ownership is asso­
ciated with lower financial reporting quality and financial transparency (Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 2004; Guedhami, 
Pittman, & Saffar, 2009). In a lending relationship, greater information barriers are more costly for potential compet­
ing banks to overcome, benefiting the incumbents consequently. Thus, we conjecture that SOEs would be subject to 
greater information rents in the credit market.
On the side of banks, the four largest commercial banks in China,1 often dubbed as the Big Four, are controlled by the 
central government; in contrast, other commercial banks have widely dispersed ownership structures often without a 
controlling owner (see Table A1 in the Appendix). Due to more severe dual-objective and separation of ownership and 
control problems than other banks, the Big Four's lending decision making is less likely based on borrowers’ creditwor­
thiness (Berger, Hasan, & Zhou, 2009; Iannotta, Nocera, & Sironi, 2013; Sapienza, 2004). For this reason, the quantity 
and quality of proprietary information the Big Four acquire might be lower, and so would rents they are able to charge.
1 The Agricultural Bank of China, the China Construction Bank, the Bank of China, and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China combined held about half 
of the industry assets during 2003-2012 and made 60% of loans in our sample.
2 As an anonymous reviewer points out, additional factors to consider include government intervention and political connections. “Policy lending” between 
the Big Four and SOEs abounded in 1980s and early 1990s whereby banks served as an intermediary to channel funds from the Central Bank to SOEs (Wei 
& Wang, 1997). The Big Four-SOE lockup greatly loosened since 1990s as banks became more market-oriented (Cull &Xu, 2003). Thus in our sample period 
(1996-2014), government intervention is relatively less relevant. Khwaja and Mian (2005), however, argue that political connections would still facilitate 
lending from the Big Four to SOEs. Anecdotes run that sometimes managers of SOEs faced political pressure to borrow from only the Big Four, or vice versa. 
The implication of political connections on the holdup problem, however, is again ambiguous as the pressure can be on either party.
In summary, we make two hypotheses about the banks’ rent extraction in China's credit market:
H1: Holding all else constant, SOEs are subject to greater information rents than non-SOE firms.
H2: Holding all else constant, the Big Four banks extract smaller information rents than non-Big Four banks.
The lending relationships between the Big Four banks and SOEs are especially interesting, as the common politi­
cal and social goals could bring them into the loan transactions. In such SOE-Big Four transactions, impacts of state 
ownership on both parties would play a role in determining the cost of loans. On the one hand, the higher information 
asymmetry of SOEs impedes them from switching to alternative lenders, suggesting higher bank rents. On the other 
hand, the shared political and social goals further diminish the importance of information production, leading to lower 
bank rents. The net effect is thus an empirical issue.2
Our investigation is based on a proprietary, loan-level data set that spans the period May 1996 through Decem­
ber 2014. The data set contains detailed information of 10,543 traditional loans to private and public firms in China. 
In order to detect information rents in a bank-firm relationship, we compare the loan pricing before and after the 
borrower's equity IPO. We measure the loan rate by the percentage interest rate spread—namely, the difference of a 
loan's interest rate from China's benchmark interest rates—as a percentage of the benchmark.3 Overall, SOEs exhibit 
a greater decline in the spread around IPOs (4.27%) than non-SOEs (1.47%). After controlling for loan, firm, and bank 
characteristics, an average SOE's spread decline is 1.58 percentage points greater than that of a non-SEO firm, consis­
tent with our expectation. This translates into a difference of 9.5 basis points in interest rate decline if the benchmark 
rate is 6% (the average in our sample period). With similar controls, the declines in the Big Four's interest rate spreads 
around the borrowers’ IPOs are on average 1.80 percentage points lower than those of non-Big Four banks, also con­
sistent with our expectation. Out of Big Four loans, spread decline is markedly more pronounced for SOEs than for 
non-SOEs, indicating the Big Four fetch higher rents from the banking relationships with SOEs.
3 The People's Bank of China (PBOC), China's central bank, set benchmark rates for loans that depend on macroeconomic conditions and loan maturity. Each 
benchmark rate supposedly accounts for the level of risk of loans in its category. Thus, the interest rate spread can be viewed as the risk-adjusted “abnormal” 
rate. In China's banking market, loan rates were often quoted as certain percentage of the benchmark rates. Our use of percentage interest rate spread follows 
this practice. Xu, Rixtel, and Wang (2016) use the same measure.
4 Commercial banks in China could set their lending rates between a floor rate and a ceiling rate during 1996-2004. The ceiling was removed in 2004 and the 
floor removed in 2013. See details of the evolving process of interest rate regulation in China in Section 2.
Competing, but not necessarily conflicting, interpretations of the loan rate declines around IPOs include IPO's risk 
effect and cash flow effect. The former holds that an equity IPO lowers the firm's debt ratio and financial risk, which in 
turn leads to lower credit cost (Hsu, Reed, & Rocholl, 2010; Pagano, Panetta, & Zingales, 1998). The latter argues that 
certification by investment banks (Carter & Manaster, 1990) and increased investor recognition could lead to higher 
future cash flows and hence reduce credit cost. We control for these factors by incorporating capital structure, under­
writer reputation, and analyst coverage in the model and obtain the same results.
Alternatively, the SOE versus non-SOE discrepancy in loan rate declines may arise due to ownership structure 
changes of SOEs. In an IPO, an SOE brings in new private owners, swaying the objective function toward profit max­
imization. This may drive the firm to more aggressively negotiate loan terms, resulting in a larger drop in loan rate. 
Inconsistent with this conjecture, though, we find that SOEs with an increase or a minor decrease in state ownership 
experience greater interest rate declines after IPO than those with a major decrease in state ownership. In addition, 
when we exclude those SOEs with a major drop in state ownership, we still find that SOEs experience significantly 
greater spread decline than non-SOEs. Hence, the interest rate decline is not attributable to the change in state own­
ership around IPOs.
We have considered the potential influence of interest rate liberalization in China on banks’ information rents.4 
Relaxation in interest rate regulation expands banks’ pricing capacity, incentivizes their information production, and 
may ultimately entrench or compromise incumbent banks’ holdup power. After controlling for the interest rate liber­
alization, our findings do not change. We also control for post-IPO information asymmetry of borrower firms and find 
the same results.
Our findings are also robust to alternative sample selections, with different periods around IPOs, including only 
firms that went public after one round of application, and with the restriction that sample loans are from the same 
banks around IPOs. In addition, we use the matched sample approach to control for the potential endogeneity of IPO 
decisions, and the results remain qualitatively unchanged.
Despite the accumulating evidence of banks’ rent extraction, all investigations thus far consider developed markets 
in which profit-maximizing, privately held companies and banks are domiciled (e.g., Hale & Santos, 2009; Schenone, 
2010; Wu et al., 2009). Very little is known about how banks and borrowing firms interact to determine the cost of 
loans in an environment where either party may have incentives other than pursuing maximum profits. Our paper 
represents the first peek into the lending relationship confounded by government ownerships. It complements and 
extends the existing literature of relationship banking (Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, & Srinivasan, 2011; Degryse &Van 
Cayseele, 2000; L0pez-Espinosa, Mayordomo, & Moreno, 2017; Petersen & Rajan, 1994; Prilmeier, 2017), and explores 
yet another implication of state ownership in business management. While promoting social welfare, state ownership 
undercuts the efficiency of both banks and borrowing firms in that it weakens banks’ incentive to information produc­
tion and yet elevates firms’ borrowing cost.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the background of the Chinese banking market. 
Section 3 describes our variables and methodology. Section 4 presents the main results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 | AN OVERVIEW OF CHINA'S BANKING MARKET
Government intervention in the credit market is perceived as very common in China (Berger et al., 2009; Jia, 2009). 
For a long time, PBOC, the central bank in China, limited commercial banks’ pricing capacity on loans by regulating 
interest rates. Prior to May 1996, lending institutions had to provide credit at the exact interest rates mandated by the 
PBOC. During May 1996 through October 2004, the central bank set benchmark interest rates for loans of different 
maturities as well as designated both ceilings and floors for those rates. For instance, in May 1996, the benchmark 
interest rate for a 1 year loan is 10.98%, and the ceiling (floor) rate for loans made by commercial banks to small-sized 
enterprises is 110% (90%) of the benchmark. Market rates set by commercial banks had to float within such regulatory 
bands. The interest rate bands were expanded a few times during this period, before the ceilings on interest rates were 
removed in October 2004. In July 2013, floors were removed for all bank loans, and banks gained full pricing capacity.
Another salient characteristic of China's banking sector is the preeminent position of the four largest, state-owned 
commercial banks. According to the 2015 Almanac of China's Finance and Banking,5 during 2010-2014 the Big Four on 
average owned over 40% of industry assets. Other players in China's credit market include 12 joint-stock commercial 
banks, city commercial banks, rural credit unions, and others. The Big Four differ from other players not only in size 
but also in ownership structure (Table A1 in the Appendix). The actual controller of the Big Four banks is the central 
government (Ministry of Finance), while non-Big Four banks have no controlling owner or are controlled by provincial 
or city governments, enterprises, or individual investors. Bai et al. (2006) argue that compared with local governments, 
central governments care more about social stability and impose a higher level of restrictions and intervention on affil­
iated banks. In addition, Gao, Wang, Yang, and Zhao (2017) show that the average state ownership of the Big Four 
is more than 10 times of that of non-Big Four banks. The contrast in ownership structure means the Big Four banks 
are subject to substantially more political interference and behave less like profit maximizers (Barth, Caprio, & Levine, 
2004; Ferri, 2009; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2002).
3 | DATA AND VARIABLES
3.1 | Data
The sample construction starts with identifying the 1,704 IPOs on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange between 1999 and 2012. We then manually collect these firms’ loan data around their IPOs. The pre-IPO 
loan data are obtained from IPO prospectuses and the post-IPO loan data from these companies’ annual reports. We 
collect loan data for only the 3 years immediately following the IPO, because Pagano et al. (1998) find that the infor­
mation effects of IPO hold for no more than 3 years. For symmetry, we use pre-IPO loan data during the 3 years prior 
to the IPO. The sample thus obtained is the first ever to have loan-level price information on China's credit market.5 6
5 Almanac of China's Finance and Banking, Almanac of China's Finance and Banking Editorial Board. http://tongji.cnki.net/kns55/navi/HomePage.aspx?id=N 
2018070031&name=YXCVB&floor=1
6 Extant studies on Chinese loan markets use yearly aggregate firm-level data from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database (e.g., 
Chen, Lobo, Wang, &Yu, 2013) rely on loan-level data sets provided by a few state-owned banks (Chang, Liao, Yu, & Ni, 2014; Qian, Strahan, & Yang, 2015), or 
focus on nonprice terms of the post-IPO loan contracts (Gao et al., 2017; Xu et al., 2016).
We complement the loan data with the firm-specific information from the CSMAR database and the Wind database, 
as well as bank-specific information from the BankScope database.
Following Hale and Santos (2009) and Schenone (2010), we exclude 32 financial firms, 947 firms with only pre- or 
post-IPO loans, and 230 firms for which our control variables are missing. This leaves us 10,543 loans for 495 IPO 
firms during 1996-2014, with an average of about 21 loans per firm. Of these loans, 5,491 (52.08%) are made pre-IPO, 
and 5,052 (47.92%) are made post-IPO; 3,690 (35.00%) are borrowed by SOEs, and the rest by nonstate-owned firms; 
6,395 (60.66%) are made by the Big Four banks, and the rest by the non-Big Four banks. Table A2 in the Appendix shows 
the distribution of loans in various categories.
3.2 I Variables
Our main interest lies in the change in interest rates on bank loans around IPOs. Instead of the actual interest rate, we 
focus on the percentage spread (Spread), measured as the difference in interest rate from the benchmark interest rate 
set by the PBOC as a percentage of the benchmark rate. Because the benchmark rate reflects the PBOC's assessment 
of market conditions and differs for loans of different maturities, the spread can be roughly viewed as the risk-adjusted 
“abnormal” rate. It is calculate as:
()
To capture the interest rate changes around IPOs, we create a dummy variable, PostIPO, which takes the value of1 
fora loan made after the borrower firm's IPO. We also use two dummy variables to denote different types of borrowers 
and lenders: SOE is equal to1 for loans of state-owned firms; Big4 is equal to1 for loans made by the Big Four banks.
In the baseline model, we control for major loan, firm, and bank relationship characteristics that are known to 
influence interest rates. Loan characteristics include the maturity (Maturity), the loan amount (Amount), and whether 
a loan is secured (Secured). Secured is equal to1 if a loan has collaterals or guarantors. Firm characteristics include firm 
age (Age), size (Size), asset tangibility (Tangible), investment return (ROA), financial leverage (Leverage), and earnings 
volatility (Earnings volatility). Size is measured as the logarithm of total assets in millions of constant RMB yuan of the 
year 990. Asset tangibility is the sum of inventories and plant, property, and equipment as a ratio to total assets. 
Financial leverage is total debt over assets, controlling for the decline in financial risk of the borrower firm around 
IPO thanks to the equity capital raised. Following Boubakri, Cosset, and Saffar (2013), earnings volatility is found as 
standard deviation of operating profit margin (EBIT/Assets) in rolling periods of three preceding years and proxies for 
the borrower's operating risk.
We measure a firm's banking relationship with the following two variables. At the bank level, we follow Schenone 
(200) to define Relationship intensity as the number of loans a bank has made to the firm as a ratio to the total num­
ber of loans the firm has received from all banks. At the firm level, we measure its Loan concentration in a year as the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of bank shares. HHI proxies for the intensity of competition among banks for a 
firm's business; a higher HHI value corresponds to less competition for incumbent banks.
We control for the changes in China's credit market conditions mainly using three dummy variables: Liberalization I, 
Liberalization II, and Recession. The first two capture the process of interest rate liberalization in China during the sample 
period. Liberalization I is equal to1 for loans taken after the PBOC removed the interest rate ceilings for commercial 
bank loans on October 28, 2004, but before rate floors were removed on July 19, 2013. Liberalization II is equal to1 
for loans after July 19, 2013. Recession is equal to1 for loans taken in recession periods. Santos and Winton (2008) and 
Mattes, Steffen, and Wahrenburg (2013) show that banks take greater rents when increased uncertainty magnifies the 
difficulties of outside capital suppliers in evaluating the quality of borrowers. Following them, we identify two recession 
periods using the Early Warning Index of Macroeconomic Climate,7 respectively from July 1997 to October 2002, and 
from January 2012 to December 2014.
7 The Early Warning Index of Macroeconomic Climate, from the Wind database, is a monthly index that measures the probability with which the economy is 
in a recession using three categories of economic variables after the removal of measurement errors as well as seasonal and other short-term fluctuations. In 
the same vein as Santos and Winton (2008) and Mattes et al. (2013), we identify a recession as a period when the Early Warning Index is below its long-run 
average for at least four consecutive quarters.
Table provides detailed variable definitions. Statistic summary of the variables in our sample is presented in 
Table 2. The actual interest rate averages 6.036% and ranges between 0.6% and 14.94%. Spread on average is negative 
at -0.4, indicating the actual loan rates are merely 0.114%, or 0.7 basis points, lower than the average benchmark 
rate. The median spread is zero. However, actual rates can widely deviate from the benchmark, with the spread ranging
TABLE 1 Variable definitions
Variable Definition
Actual interest rate The loan's raw interest rate
Spread The difference of a loan interest rate from the benchmark interest rate set by 
the People's Bank of China, expressed as a percentage of the benchmark 
rate
PostIPO A dummy variable, equal to 1 for loans after the firm’s equity IPO
SOE A dummy variable, equal to 1 if the ultimate controlling shareholder of a 
borrower is the central government or a local government
Big4
Loan characteristics
Maturity
A dummy variable, equal to 1 for the loans made by the four first-tier 
commercial banks in China that are controlled by the central government
Loan maturity, measured in years
Amount The log of 1 plus loan amount, where the loan amount is in millions of constant
RMB yuan of the year 1990
Secured
Firm characteristics
Age
A dummy variable, equal to 1 if the loan has collaterals or guarantors
The number of years since incorporation
ROA Net income divided by assets
Tangible Inventories plus plant, property, and equipment over assets
Size Log of assets in millions of constant RMB yuan of the year 1990
Leverage Total debt over assets
Earnings volatility The standard deviation of EBIT-to-asset ratio in rolling periods of three 
preceding years
Banking relationship characteristics
Loan concentration The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of bank loans for a firm in a year
Relationship intensity
Time variables
Liberalization I
The number of a firm's historical loans from a bank as a ratio of the total 
number of the firm's historical loans (Schenone, 2010)
A dummy variable, equal to 1 for loans taken after October 28, 2004, when 
the PBOC removed the ceiling for commercial bank interest rates, and 
before July 19, 2013, when the PBOC completely removed the restrictions 
on interest rates
Liberalization II A dummy variable, equal to 1 for loans taken after July 19, 2013, when the 
PBOC completely removed the restrictions on interest rates
Recession
Information asymmetry variables
Underwriter reputation
A dummy variable, equal to 1 for loans taken during recession periods, July 
1997 to October 2002, and January 2012 to December 2014
Market share, in percentages, of the IPO lead underwriter in China's IPO 
market during the year
Analyst coverage Log of 1 plus the average number of analysts following the firm in the 3 years 
after its IPO
Disclosure violation A dummy variable, equal to 1 if a firm is criticized for or charged with 
violations of information disclosure regulations by the stock exchange 
where its stocks trade, or by the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) in the [-3, 3] event window
Earning quality Abnormal total accrual, where total accruals are the change in noncash 
working capital before income taxes payable less total depreciation 
expense. Take total accruals of prior period (t - 1) as “normal” total accrual, 
thus the “abnormal” total accrual is the difference between current and 
normal total accruals
TABLE 2 Summary statistics
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max Obs.
Actual interest rate 6.036 5.900 1.447 0.600 14.940 9,857
Spread -0.114 0.000 7.011 -66.930 50.000 10,543
PostIPO 0.479 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 10,543
SOE 0.350 0.000 0.477 0.000 1.000 10,543
Big4 0.606 1.000 0.488 0.000 1.000 10,543
Loan characteristics
Maturity 2.047 1.000 2.174 0.017 25.000 10,543
Amount (million yuan) 41.810 135.110 15.310 0.020 4,402.760 10,543
Secured 0.744 1.000 0.437 0.000 1.000 10,543
Firm characteristics
Age 6.781 5.920 4.656 0.001 26.500 9,656
ROA 0.078 0.064 0.091 -1.153 1.418 9,656
Tangible 0.427 0.398 0.222 0.002 0.974 9,656
Size (million yuan) 4,247 11,993 1,564 75 136,752 9,656
Leverage 0.447 0.458 0.166 0.004 0.943 9,656
Earnings volatility 0.104 0.089 0.077 0.013 0.811 9,656
Bank relationship variables
Loan concentration 0.338 0.273 0.275 0.000 1.000 10,543
Relationship intensity 0.404 0.333 0.310 0.000 1.000 10,543
Time variables
Liberalization I 0.696 1.000 0.460 0.000 1.000 10,543
Liberalization II 0.019 0.000 0.136 0.000 1.000 10,543
Recession 0.234 0.000 0.424 0.000 1.000 10,543
Note. The sample includes 10,543 loans during 1996-2014 for 495 firms that had their IPOs during 1999-2012. This table 
reports summary statistics for loan, firm, banking relationship characteristics, and time variables. Variables are as defined in 
Table 1. Loan amount and firm size (total assets) are in millions of constant RMB yuan of the year 1990.
from -66.93% to 50%. About 48% of loans in our sample are made after borrowers’ IPOs. SOEs take 35% of the loans, 
and the Big Four make 60.6% of the loans. Loan maturity ranges from about a week (0.017) to 25 years, with an average 
of about 2 years and a median of 1 year. Thus, roughly half of the loans are short-term loans. The average loan amount 
is 41.81 million yuan. About three-fourths of the loans are either collateralized or guaranteed.
An average borrower firm is 6.781 years old, with total assets of 4.247 billion yuan and an ROA of 7.8%. Tangible 
assets and debt account for 42.7% and 44.7%, respectively, of the firm's total assets. Earnings volatility averages 0.104.
The HHI measuring loan concentration at the firm level averages 0.338, ranging from nearly 0 to 1. Relationship 
intensity has a mean of 0.404, indicating that for an average loan, its bank has made two loans out of every five loans 
the firm has received.
4 | RESULTS
4.1 I Changes in loan characteristics and banking relationship around the IPO: A first look
Table 3, Panel A, presents the comparison of loan spread and other characteristics around borrowers’ IPOs. Pre-IPO 
loans have on average a positive spread of 0.989%, while post-IPO loans’ average spread is negative at -1.314%, repre­
senting a decline of 2.303 percentage points that is statistically significant at the 1% level. If the benchmark rate is 6%,
TABLE 3 Loan characteristics and banking relationships: Pre- versus post-IPO
Full period
Panel A: Loan characteristics
Pre-IPO Post-IPO Difference t-Value
Spread
All loans -0.114 0.989 -1.314 -2.303*** -6.923
SOE -0.566 1.119 -3.154 -4.274*** -7.182
Non-SOE 0.129 0.900 -0.570 -1.470*** -3.637
Maturity (years)
All loans 2.046 1.749 2.370 0.621*** 14.801
SOE 2.328 2.132 2.628 0.496*** 6.099
Non-SOE 1.895 1.486 2.265 0.779*** 16.348
Amount
All loans 1.236 1.142 1.337 0.196*** 19.672
SOE 1.192 1.020 1.454 0.434*** 22.166
Non-SOE 1.259 1.225 1.290 0.065*** 5.911
Secured
All loans 0.744 0.785 0.698 -0.087*** -10.310
SOE 0.713 0.782 0.607 -0.175*** -11.708
Non-SOE 0.760 0.788 0.735 -0.053*** -5.118
Panel B: Banking relationship variables
Loan concentration
All loans 0.338 0.356 0.318 -0.038*** -7.128
SOE 0.316 0.339 0.279 -0.060*** -6.329
Non-SOE 0.350 0.368 0.333 -0.035*** -5.356
Relationship intensity
All loans 0.404 0.427 0.378 -0.050*** -8.307
SOE 0.441 0.483 0.376 -0.106*** -9.863
Non-SOE 0.384 0.390 0.378 -0.012 -1.611
Note. This table presents the comparison in loan characteristics and banking relationship variables between pre-IPO and post­
IPO subsamples. The mean values are presented for all loans, and for loans of SOEs and those of non-SOEs, in the full sample 
period, and in the pre-IPO period and post-IPO period, separately. t-Tests are conducted to test the differences between the 
pre-IPO means and the post-IPO means.
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05 and .10 level, respectively.
then such a decline amounts to 14 basis points. According to the literature, this decline in loan spread is indicative of the 
holdup rents banks charge. For loans of SOEs, this decline in spread is 4.274 percentage points, much larger than that 
for loans of non-SOEs (1.470 percentage points), consistent with our conjecture that SOEs suffer from greater bank 
rents. After a firm goes public, loan maturity lengthens and the amount increases, and fewer loans need collaterals or 
guarantees, all consistent with IPOs moderating information asymmetry of issuing companies.
Panel B presents the changes in banking relationship characteristics around IPOs. An average firm's loan concen­
tration (HHI) is 0.356 prior to its IPO, which declines to 0.318 after the IPO. Relationship intensity also declines from 
0.427 to 0.378. Thus, a firm uses loans from a larger number of banks post-IPO, as predicted by the theory. SOEs exhibit 
lower loan concentration but greater relationship intensity with banks, indicating that SOEs maintain longer-term rela­
tionships with a larger number of banks. Notably, the decline in SOEs’ loan concentration (-0.060) around IPO is more 
pronounced than that for non-SOE firms (-0.035); relationship intensity also declines more for SOEs than for non-SOE
TABLE 4 Comparison of SOEs and non-SOEs in the pre-IPO period
SOE Non-SOE Difference t-Value
Loan characteristics
Spread 1.119 0.900 0.219 0.480
Maturity 2.132 1.486 0.646*** 12.210
Amount 1.023 1.225 -0.202*** -15.921
Secured 0.785 0.788 -0.006 -0.531
Firm characteristics
Age 4.300 6.898 -2.598*** -20.232
Size 3.186 3.081 0.105*** 9.320
ROA 0.057 0.117 -0.060*** -28.261
Tangible 0.361 0.412 -0.051*** -8.723
Leverage 0.491 0.480 0.011** 2.465
Earnings volatility 0.052 0.041 0.011*** 4.165
Banking relationship variables
Loan concentration 0.339 0.368 -0.029*** -3.935
Relationship intensity 0.483 0.390 0.093*** 10.626
Note. This table compares loan characteristics, firm characteristics, and banking relationship variables between SOEs and non- 
SOEs in the pre-IPO period. The firm, loan, and bank relationship variables are as defined in Table 1. For each variable, the 
difference in mean between SOEs and non-SOEs is reported and tested using a t-test.
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05 and .10 level, respectively.
firms (-0.106 vs. -0.012). These comparisons all point to that SOEs’ borrowing opportunities improve after the IPO by 
a larger degree than non-SOE firms, indicating that the holdup problem is more severe for SOEs pre-IPO.
It is also interesting to know if the differences between SOEs and non-SOEs are significant in the pre-IPO period. In 
Table 4, we present the comparison of loan, firm, and bank relationship characteristics between SOEs and non-SOEs in 
the pre-IPO period. On average, SOE borrowers have slightly higher interest rates than non-SOE borrowers, but the 
difference is not statistically significant. SOEs' loans are smaller in amount and longer in maturity, and about equally 
likely to be secured. SOEs and non-SOEs are significantly different in firm characteristics and banking relationship 
variables. On average, SOEs are younger, larger, less profitable, with higher financial leverage and less tangible assets. 
They also feature greater earnings volatility in the pre-IPO period. Just like in the whole period, SOEs exhibit lower loan 
concentration but greater relationship intensity with banks. These distinctions point to the importance of accounting 
for firm, loan, and banking relationship variables in examining bank rents.
4.2 | State ownership and loan rates around IPO: Main results
Table 5 reports the first set of multivariate tests that investigate the relationship between SOEs and information 
monopoly rent in H1. We estimate the following model: 
(2)
where i,j, and t are subscripts for the borrower firm, the lending bank, and year of the loan, respectively. The dependent 
variable is the interest rate spread. Main explanatory variables are PostIPO (the indicator of a post-IPO loan), SOE (the 
indicator of an SOE), and their interaction. Control variables include loan characteristics, firm characteristics, banking 
relationship characteristics, and time variables. Firm and year fixed effects are controlled for.
We first run the regression without the SOE indicator and the interaction term in the full sample and report the 
result in column 1. PostIPO, the variable of interest, receives a negative coefficient of -1.415, statistically significant
TABLE 5 State ownership and loan rates around IPOs
All
(1)
SOE
(2)
Non-SOE
(3)
All
(4)
PostIPOijt -1.415*** -3.059*** -0.857 -0.972*
(-2.80) (-3.02) (-1.42) (-1.71)
SOEit -1.426
(-1.33)
SOEit x PostIPOijt -1.575***
(-2.70)
Maturityijt -1.084*** -1.006*** -1.174*** -1.093***
(-11.47) (-6.62) (-9.36) (-11.55)
Amountijt -0.234 -1.975*** 0.711 -0.207
(-0.61) (-3.02) (1.51) (-0.54)
Securedijt 3.106*** 4.296*** 2.605*** 3.083***
(7.42) (5.12) (5.38) (7.36)
Ageit - 1 -0.219 2.028*** -1.417*** -0.204
(-0.52) (2.74) (-2.75) (-0.48)
Sizeit - 1 3.349** 8.351** 0.254 2.963**
(2.30) (2.10) (0.16) (2.01)
ROAit - 1 -4.668 -1.662 -3.580 -4.106
(-1.45) (-0.14) (-1.07) (-1.27)
Tangibleit - 1 4.170** -2.515 6.598** 3.968**
(2.24) (-0.87) (2.38) (2.13)
Leverageit - 1 5.454*** 11.979*** 5.554* 5.635***
(2.76) (3.52) (1.93) (2.85)
Earnings volatilityi 4.709** 6.099* 3.013 3.893*
(2.02) (1.66) (1.58) (1.90)
Loan concentrationit 1.503* 0.755 2.611** 1.377*
(1.81) (0.51) (2.53) (1.66)
Relationship intensityijt 0.014 -1.433 0.917 0.032
(0.02) (-1.41) (1.34) (0.06)
Recessionijt 4.984*** 4.351*** 8.199 4.670***
(3.75) (3.07) (1.28) (3.48)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 9,656 3,112 6,544 9,656
R2 0.449 0.437 0.467 0.450
Note. This table presents the fixed-effects estimation of the regressions of interest rate spread on explanatory variables. The 
sample includes 10,543 loans for 495 firms during 1996-2014. For each firm, all loans in the 3 years prior to the IPO and the 3 
years post-IPO are included. The dependent variable is Spread, the percentage interest rate spread relative to the benchmark 
interest rates. PostIPO is equal to 1 for a loan taken after the firm's IPO. SOE is equal to 1 for a firm whose ultimate controlling 
shareholder is the government. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05 and .10 level, respectively.
at the 1% level. It indicates that holding all else constant, an average firm's loan spread declines by 1.415 percentage 
points after its IPO. Assuming a 6% benchmark interest rate, this represents a rate decline of 8.5 basis points. As the 
IPO disseminates a large amount of information to the credit market as well as provides alternative nonbank financ­
ing channels, we interpret this rate decline as evidence of the holdup problem and banks’ rent extraction prior to the 
borrower IPOs in China's banking market.
To examine whether state ownership influences bank rents, we run the same regression in the subsample of SOE 
loans and non-SOE loans separately and report the results in columns 2 and 3. In the SOE subsample, the coefficient on 
PostIPO is -3.059, statistically significant at the 1% level; in contrast, in the non-SOE subsample, this coefficient is much 
lower in magnitude, -0.857, which is not statistically different from zero. This contrast indicates SOEs suffer from more 
severe holdup problem, consistent with our hypothesis.
To verify this finding, we estimate Equation (2), bringing in the SOE indicator and its interaction with PostIPO. Col­
umn 4 presents the results. PostIPO receives a coefficient of -0.972, which is of marginal significance statistically. This 
coefficient captures the information rents charged on non-SOE borrowers. The coefficient on SOE is negative but not 
statistically different from zero. Thus on average, SOEs and non-SOEs do not differ in loan rate spread. The interaction 
term between SOE and PostIPO obtains a negative and statistically significant coefficient of -1.575, capturing the dif­
ference between SOEs and non-SOE firms in spread decline around the IPOs, corroborating the subsample regression 
results. Assuming a 6% benchmark interest rate, this coefficient indicates that the raw interest rate decline around 
IPO for SOEs is 9.5 basis points larger than for non-SOEs. In short, the results show that firms are able to borrow from 
banks at lower interest rates after their equity IPOs, and SOEs enjoy greater interest rate declines than their non-SOE 
peers, consistent with our hypothesis.
Most control variables load in the regressions, speaking for their impacts on cost of bank loans. The percentage 
spread is negatively associated with the loan maturity. This relationship is probably mechanical because a same raw 
spread represents a smaller percentage spread for a longer term loan with a greater benchmark interest rate. The 
spread decreases as the loan amount increases, consistent with the economies of scale in loan size (Hale & Santos, 
2009). Secured obtains a negative coefficient, because collaterals and guarantees are sought for only riskier credits 
(e.g., Berger & Udell, 1990).
The signs of the slopes for firm characteristics show that firms with more tangible assets and lower leverage enjoy 
lower interest rates. It is worth noting that the inclusion of financial leverage controls for the decline in financial risk 
after the IPO raises equity capital. Earnings volatility and loan concentration both load positively, indicating that riskier 
firms and firms facing low bank competition pay higher cost for their loans. Relationship intensity does not load. A 
potential interpretation is that loan concentration is an alternative measure of the strength of banking relationship, 
which subsumes the effect of relationship intensity observed in Schenone (2010).
4.3 I Robustness checks
4.3.1 | Alternative samples
Shorter periods around IPOs
We check the robustness of the above results using alternative samples. First, we shorten the width of window for each 
sample firm from six years around its IPO—that is, 3 years pre-IPO and 3 years post-IPO or the [-3, 3] period—to 2 years 
around the IPO—that is, 1 year pre-IPO and 1 year post-IPO or the [-1, 1] period. This change shrinks the sample size, 
but minimizes the variations in loan interest rate attributable to factors not related to the IPO effect. We run the same 
regressions as above and report the results in Table 6, columns 1-3. In the subsample of SOE loans, PostIPO receives 
a statistically significant coefficient of -3.597; in the subsample of non-SOE loans, the same coefficient is -1.417, also 
statistically different from zero. The latter is notable as it indicates non-SOE borrowers are also subject to bank rent 
extraction in the pre-IPO period. This finding is intuitive because banks command holdup power against any borrowers 
as long as they possess proprietary information and/or the borrowers have limited alternative financing channels. In 
the full sample regression augmented with the SOE indicator variable and its interaction with PostIPO, PostIPO barely
TABLE 6 State ownership and loan rates around IPOs: Alternative samples
lyear pre-and 1 year post-IPO Firms with one round of applications
Pre- and post-IPO loans from the 
same banks
Same-bank loans of firms with one 
round of applications
SOE
(1)
Non-SOE
(2)
All
(3)
SOE
(4)
Non-SOE
(5)
All
(6)
SOE
(7)
Non-SOE
(8)
All
(9)
SOE
(10)
Non-SOE
(11)
All
(12)
POStIPOijt -3.597*** -1.417” -1.594*** -4.812*** -1.029 -1.328” -3.450"' -0.917 -1.072' -4.814*** -0.853 -1.285”
(-2.88) (-2.24) (-2.63) (-4.36) (-1.63) (-2.22) (-2.84) (-1.44) (-1.73) (-3.56) (-1.27) (-1.96)
SOEit -8.967 -3.911* -8.944 -4.285
(-1.38) (-1.81) (-0.66) (-0.32)
SOEit x Post/POijt -0.972* -2.642'" -1.602' -2.589”
(-1.91) (-2.70) (-1.85) (-2.34)
Loan
characteristics
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm
characteristics
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank relationships Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,847 4,271 6,118 2,794 5,833 8,627 1,853 4,022 5,875 1,739 3,561 5,300
R2 0.539 0.596 0.564 0.445 0.444 0.437 0.493 0.438 0.451 0.404 0.387 0.385
Note. This table presents the fixed effects estimation of the regression of interest rate spread on explanatory variables in alternative samples. The first alternative sample includes loans during 
only 1 year before and 1 year after the IPO, and the results are displayed in columns 1-3. The second alternative sample includes loans only for firms going public after the first round of IPO 
applications, and the results are displayed in columns 4-6. Columns 7-9 consider the pre- and post-IPO loans of the same firms from the same banks. Columns 10-12 report the results of the 
same-bank loans of firms going public after the first round of IPO applications. The dependent variable is Spread, the percentage interest rate spread relative to the benchmark interest rates. 
PostIPO is equal to 1 for a loan taken after the firm's IPO. SOE is equal to 1 for an SOE. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses.
***,**,* indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05 and .10 level, respectively.
loads and the interaction term loads with a negative coefficient of -0.972. Overall, these results are similar to those in 
Table 4 in that SOEs exhibit greater declines in interest rate around IPOs, consistent with our H1.
Firms with one round of IPO applications
Another way to refine our investigation is to focus on firms that go public after only one round of IPO applications. In 
China, firms file IPO applications with the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) for approval. In the applica­
tion process, CSRC requires firms publish their prospectuses on the CSRC Web site as well as the designated newspa­
pers (e.g., China Securities Daily).8 A firm has to go through the process again if its application is rejected by CSRC. In our 
sample, 37 firms went public after at least two rounds of applications. A vast amount of information has already been 
disclosed to the public long ahead of their IPOs, and including these firms would bias our results toward no interest 
rate decline around IPOs.9
8 The median (mean) length of the “information window”—that is, the period from the disclosure to IPO—is 121 (193) days during the 2012-2014 period, 
according to the Wind database. This time window was much narrower before 2012.
9 In a similar vein, Hale and Santos (2009) document that the information effect of bond IPOs is larger for firms that get their first credit rating at the time of 
IPO than for those that have a rating prior to their IPOs, as prior credit rating would have carried a substantial amount of information.
Therefore, we exclude 1,069 loans of these 37 firms from our sample to rerun the baseline regressions. The results, 
presented in columns 4-6 of Table 6, are consistent and strong. PostIPO and SOE x PostIPO obtain coefficients that are 
notably larger and sometimes statistically more significant than in Table 5.
Same-bank loans
Our main sample includes all bank loans our sample firms have received during the [-3, 3] period. These loans may 
come from a different set of banks pre-IPO from post-IPO. There are two benefits of considering loans from different 
banks: (1) the sample is significantly larger and better represents these firms’ loan portfolios, and (2) it enables us to 
correctly construct banking relationship variables. A potential drawback, however, is that loans from different banks 
are less comparable. Thus, in yet another check, we restrict our sample to only loans that have counterpart loans from 
the same banks in the other period across the IPO event. To illustrate, assume firm A has a loan from bank M and a loan 
from bank N during the 3 years prior to its IPO, and a loan from bank M during the 3 years post-IPO. Then only the 
two loans from bank M will be kept, and the loan from bank N drops out. This additional restriction ensures that we 
compare interest rates of the same bank-firm pairs during the pre- and post-IPO periods.
The estimation results, reported in Table 6, columns 7-9, are consistent with our expectation—that is, both PostIPO 
and SOE x PostIPO load negatively in column 9. Their coefficients are statistically significant at only the 10% level due 
to the much smaller sample size; however, they are larger in magnitude than their counterparts in Table 5, reflecting a 
larger economic effect of IPO on loan interest rates.
We then further focus on firms with only one around of IPO applications and report the results in columns 10-12. 
The coefficients of PostIPO and SOE x PostIPO in column 12 are -1.285 and -2.589, respectively, both larger than in 
column 9, and statistically significant at the 5% level. Thus, when we examine only same-bank loans, we obtain qualita­
tively similar findings.
4.3.2 | Matched-sample investigation
Our detection of banks’ rent extraction hinges on the IPO effects on the firms’ information dissemination and financing 
channel expansion. A concern is that IPOs are not exogenous, and in particular, IPO decisions and the decline in loan 
interest rates may be driven by a same set of factors—for example, improved market conditions. If this is the case, 
then the decline in loan interest rates around IPOs cannot be interpreted as the evidence of pre-IPO rent extraction. 
Following Hale and Santos (2009), we employ the match sample approach to address this concern. The idea is that as 
the treatment sample (the listed firms) are similar to the control sample (the unlisted firms) in all characteristics but the 
IPO, the difference in interest rate patterns between the two matched samples is then attributable to the IPO event.
We restrict our investigation period to 1 year before and 1 year after the IPO date—that is, the [-1,1] period—to 
enable the matched sample investigation. For a firm in our sample, the pool of candidate control firms includes all other 
firms at the time exactly 2 years ahead of their respective IPO years. Thus, for a pair of treatment firm and control 
firm, we have 2 years around the IPO for the treatment firm and 2 years for the control firm around a hypothetical 
IPO event occurring right at t = -2. To illustrate, firm A went public on May 31, 2010, and we have its loan information 
during June 1, 2007 to May 31, 2013. This firm on May 31, 2008 (its hypothetical IPO date as a control firm) then can be 
a control firm for treatment firm B that went public on, say, July 5, 2008. We will contrast firm A's interest rate spreads 
during June 1, 2007 to May 31, 2009, against those of firm B during July 5, 2007 to July 5, 2009—that is, the [-1, 1] 
period. The 1 year gap between firm A's hypothetical [-1, 1] period and its actual IPO date minimizes the possibility 
that IPO-related information dissemination has begun.
To find control firms, we first estimate the Probit model of having the equity IPO in any given year, using a set of firm 
characteristics as explanatory variables:
(3)
where IPOit is an indicator that firm i issued an IPO in year t, Xit - 1 is the vector of aforementioned firm characteristics, 
and Φ(·) is the cumulative probability density function of the normal distribution. We use the estimated values of a and 
β to construct the propensity score for each firm i in year t as the predicted probability of an IPO.
Using this propensity score, we utilize radius matching (radius = 0.01) to match IPO firms to candidates of control 
firms. We do not force each IPO firm to have a match; instead, we drop those IPO firms that do not have a close match. 
We also drop the non-IPO firms that are not used as a match for any IPO firm. Thus, our matched sample consists of 
only those firms that are similar in their probability of having an IPO. In the first attempt, we require that a non-IPO 
firm can be used as a control for one IPO firm (one-to-one matching), and obtain 67 pairs of IPO firms and control 
firms, with a total of 1,282 loans during the [-1, 1] periods. In another attempt, we allow a non-IPO firm to be controls 
for multiple IPO firms (one-to-N matching) and find 182 private firms to match 297 IPO firms combined having 3,045 
loans. In either of the matched sample, we create a dummy variable, Treatment, that is equal to 1 for an IPO firm and 0 
for a control firm.
We then rerun Equation (2) in the matched samples with the dummy Treatment, the interaction between PostIPO 
and Treatment, and the three-way interaction among SOE, PostIPO, and Treatment on the right-hand side. For a control 
firm, PostIPO is set to take the value 1 if the loan is taken in the second half of the 2 year period. The new regressions 
constitute difference-in-difference tests that can reliably expose the effect of IPO on loan rates as well as whether 
SOEs are victims of worse rent extraction.
Table 7 reports the regression results, with those based on the one-to-one matching in columns 1 and 2 and those 
based on the one-to-N matching in columns 3 and 4. In columns 1 and 3, the interaction term PostIPO x Treatment loads 
negatively, which tells that the interest rate spread declines only around the actual IPOs but not around the hypotheti­
cal IPOs, confirming the existence of holdup problem pre-IPO. The coefficient of Treatment is negative and statistically 
significant in columns 1 and 3 but not different from zero in columns 2 and 4. This indicates that the IPO firms on aver­
age have lower interest rates than control firms, but the difference occurs in the post-IPO period. In columns 2 and 
4, the three-way interaction term SOE x PostIPO x Treatment also loads negatively, confirming our baseline finding in 
Table 5 that SOEs are subject to more severe bank rents in the pre-IPO period.10 Thus, controlling for the endogeneity 
of IPOs does not alter our results.
10 Falsification tests we conduct verify that the parallel trends assumption holds for our difference-in-difference tests (e.g., Roberts & Whited, 2013). Specifi­
cally, we contrast loan interest rates of IPO firms in their [-3, -1] period (relative to their actual IPO dates) against those of control firms in their [-1, 1] period 
(relative to their hypothetical IPO dates), and they are statistically equal. In regressions none of Treatment, PostIPO x Treatment, and SOEx PostIPO x Treatment 
loads.
TABLE 7 State ownership and loan rates around IPOs: Matched sample estimation
One-to-one matching One-to-N matching
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PostIPOijt 2.184** 3.736** 0.548 1.777
(1.99) (2.47) (0.59) (1.52)
Treatmentit -27.533** 3.288 -31.193** -0.276
(-2.06) (0.18) (-2.07) (-0.02)
PostIPOijt x Treatmentit -4.024*** -5.122*** -0.249** -1.285*
(-3.62) (-3.30) (-2.24) (-1.82)
SOEit -2.179** -2.603*
(-2.08) (-1.89)
SOEit x PostIPOijt 1.275 1.186
(0.60) (0.55)
SOEit x PostIPOijt x Treatmentit -3.065* -2.385*
(-1.77) (-1.80)
Maturityijt -0.499*** -0.512*** -0.616*** -0.628***
(-4.02) (-4.11) (-4.12) (-4.20)
Amountijt -0.949** -0.929** -0.805* -0.784*
(-2.25) (-2.20) (-1.77) (-1.72)
Securedijt 3.716*** 3.669*** 2.745*** 2.722***
(8.12) (8.00) (5.10) (5.05)
Ageit - 1 -0.939* -0.941* -0.790 -0.850
(-1.72) (-1.72) (-1.36) (-1.46)
Sizeit - 1 12.184*** 11.958*** 8.996*** 9.294***
(5.64) (5.48) (3.39) (3.50)
ROAit - 1 -7.173 -6.294 -13.500* -13.327*
(-1.12) (-0.98) (-1.75) (-1.72)
Tangibleit - 1 -3.885* -4.257** -2.386 -2.885
(-1.92) (-2.10) (-0.88) (-1.05)
Leverageit - 1 -2.223 -2.012 5.161 5.155
(-0.98) (-0.88) (1.60) (1.60)
Earnings volatilityi 1.302 1.004 4.473 4.409
(1.27) (0.90) (1.55) (1.14)
Loan concentrationit -5.732*** -5.788*** -7.831*** -7.808***
(-4.97) (-5.02) (-5.69) (-5.67)
Relationship intensityijt -0.345 -0.325 0.625 0.600
(-0.60) (-0.56) (1.03) (0.98)
Recessionijt 4.919*** 4.477*** 5.578** 5.491**
(3.63) (3.25) (2.54) (2.44)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Continues)
TABLE 7 (Continued)
One-to-one matching One-to-N matching 
(3) (4)(1) (2)
N 1,282 1,282 3,045 3,045
R2 0.565 0.578 0.532 0.538
Note. This table presents the fixed effects estimation of the regression of interest rate spread on explanatory variables in the 
sample including IPO firms and their matched private firms. The private firms are identified using propensity score matching. 
Only loans made during 1 year before and 1 year after the IPO are included. Results based on one-to-one matching are dis­
played on the left, and those based on one-to-N matching are on the right. The dependent variable is Spread, the percentage 
interest rate spread relative to the benchmark interest rates. PostIPO is equal to 1 for a loan taken after the firm's IPO. Treat­
ment is equal to 1 for an IPO firm and zero for a match firm. SOE is equal to 1 for a firm whose ultimate controlling shareholder 
is the government. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05 and .10 level, respectively.
4.3.3 | Alternative interpretation: Change in ownership structure
Besides holdup power of incumbent banks, the change in ownership structure of SOEs may give rise to the SOEs ver­
sus non-SOEs discrepancy in loan rate decline we have documented. As we discussed, SOEs pursue both financial and 
social goals. In an IPO, an SOE sells newly created and/or existing shares to new investors, including other state-owned 
institutions and corporations, privately owned institutional investors, and individual investors. If private investors gain 
greater influence on the SOE's business decisions, they will move its objective toward profit maximization. Increased 
profit maximization incentives then could drive managers to become more aggressive negotiators when dealing with 
banks, which in turn would lead to a drop in the loan interest rates. Non-SOEs, in contrast, are already profit maximizers 
before IPOs and probably will not experience a similar change in their incentives or interest rates.
To examine this alternative interpretation, we first tabulate the ownership structure of SOEs, pre- and post-IPO, in 
Table A3 in the Appendix. Our definition of SOE is based on the ultimate controller; therefore, we first check the change 
of ultimate owner around IPO in Panel A and then further investigate the changes of direct state ownership in Panel 
B. Only four out of 150 SOEs changed their ultimate controllers within 3 years after IPO. Yet, all the four new ultimate 
controllers are still governments. In other words, all SOEs remain state-owned post-IPO. Panel B reveals that out of all 
SOEs in our sample, 20 firms experienced a nonnegative change in state ownership around IPO, and the rest decreased 
their state ownership. State ownership declines by less than 20% for 36 firms, by more than 40% for 15 firms, and by 
an extent between 20% and 40% for 79 firms.
We then examine the interest rate declines around IPOs given various levels of change in state ownership and report 
the results in Table 8. First, we divide all SOEs into two groups: group 1 includes those that experienced an increase 
or minor decrease (less than 20%) in state ownership around IPO, and group 2 includes those with a major decrease 
(over 20%) in state ownership. If ownership structure change is the cause of interest rate declines, we would expect 
group 2 SOEs exhibit greater rate declines around IPO. Regressions of interest rate spread on PostIPO and all control 
variables, as shown in the first two columns of Table 8, produce negative and statistically significant coefficients on 
PostIPO, indicating both groups of SOEs witness a decline in loan rates after IPO. Moreover, the coefficient for group 
1 (-4.083) is greater in magnitude than that for group 2 (-3.253), inconsistent with the conjecture that ownership 
structure change matters. To further attack this issue, we run the Equation (2) regression in subsamples that include 
SOEs with a nonnegative change in state ownership and non-SOEs (column 3). The result is very similar to the baseline 
results reported in Table 5. The coefficient of SOE x PostIPO is -5.209, statistically significant at the 1% level, confirming 
that in absence of a decline of state ownership, SOEs on average experience a markedly larger decline in loan rate. In 
column 4,we exclude from the sample only those SOEs with a state ownership decline greater than 20%, and the results 
are qualitatively similar. Thus, we can conclude that the consideration of ownership structure change does not alter 
our main findings—that is, greater pre-IPO information monopoly rents are behind the greater interest rate declines 
of SOEs after IPO.
TABLE 8 SOEs with or without major declines in state ownership after IPO
SOEs with state 
ownership 
change > -20%
SOEs with state 
ownership 
change < -20%
All firms except for
SOEs with state 
ownership 
change < 0
SOEs with state 
ownership 
change < -20%
PostIPOijt -4.083** -3.253** -0.857 -1.230**
(-2.47) (-2.31) (-1.64) (-2.08)
SOEijt -5.779 15.296
(-0.35) (0.90)
SOEijt x PostIPOijt -5.209*** -2.961**
(-3.13) (-2.37)
Maturityijt -0.472* -1.550*** -1.121*** -0.922***
(-1.80) (-8.35) (-9.34) (-8.30)
Amountijt -1.484 -2.444*** 0.852* 0.481
(-1.38) (-3.03) (1.89) (1.12)
Securedijt 8.617*** 3.833*** 3.273*** 3.066***
(5.57) (3.86) (6.93) (6.60)
Ageit - 1 0.736 3.606*** -0.790 -0.648
(0.71) (3.26) (-1.57) (-1.41)
Sizeit - 1 24.413*** -4.757 0.061 3.048*
(3.92) (-0.80) (0.04) (1.95)
ROAit - 1 -8.277 34.538* -3.176 -5.513*
(-0.48) (1.92) (-0.96) (-1.66)
Tangibleit - 1 -42.673*** 7.005** 6.446** 1.319
(-5.25) (2.09) (2.39) (0.50)
Leverageit - 1 -6.502 6.644 5.651** 3.039
(-0.81) (1.46) (2.04) (1.13)
Earnings volatilityi 23.735 3.886 12.356 14.290*
(1.05) (0.16) (1.50) (1.84)
Loan concentrationit -4.080 2.620 1.599 0.679
(-1.56) (1.41) (1.64) (0.72)
Relationship intensityijt -0.007 -1.529 1.213* 0.683
(-0.00) (-1.32) (1.82) (1.05)
Recessionijt 12.601*** 3.038** 9.460 13.268***
(3.06) (2.10) (1.48) (4.07)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,163 1,949 7,003 7,707
R2 0.480 0.437 0.478 0.459
Note. This table presents the fixed effects estimation of the regression of interest rate spread on explanatory variables in sub­
samples of SOEs with or without a major decline (< -20%) in state ownership after IPO, as well as in subsamples where SOEs 
experiencing declines or major declines in state ownership are excluded. The dependent variable is Spread, measured as a per­
centage difference in loan interest rate from the benchmark interest rates. PostIPO is equal to 1 when firm's loan is taken after 
the IPO. SOE is equal to 1 for a firm whose ultimate controlling shareholder is the government. t-Statistics are reported in 
parentheses.
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05 and .10 level, respectively.
FIGURE 1 Loan interest rates and spreads over time in China's credit market
Note. The sample period is from May 1996 to December 2014. The vertical axis on the left is for the actual and the 
benchmark interest rates, and the vertical axis on the right is for the interest rate spread, measured as a percentage of 
the benchmark interest rate. Actual interest rate is averaged for all the loans in a month. Benchmark interest rate is 
averaged for all the base interest rates for loans with different maturities set by the People's Bank of China (PBOC) in 
a month. The gray area depicts the floating ranges of loan interest rates dictated by the PBOC.
4.3.4 | Interest rate liberalization
During our sample period, China's banking sector underwent gradual liberalization of interest rates, as depicted in 
Figure 1. The gray area represents the allowable interest rate range that expanded over time. The process exhibits two 
notable observations. First, actual interest rates of commercial banks (dotted line) closely track the official benchmark 
interest rates (gray line). Second, interest rate spread (solid line), the percentage gap between actual and benchmark 
interest rates, fluctuates around the average value of zero. There is not a discernable pattern of how the expansion in 
allowable interest rate range influences the interest rate spread.
Theoretically, the impact of interest rate liberalization on banks’ rents is unclear as it provides incentives to both 
incumbent and outside banks to engage in information production. On the one hand, interest rate regulation restricts 
banks’ rents involving information advantage, because deficient loan pricing ability impedes the complete compensa­
tion for cost of information production, which dampens incumbent banks’ information production incentives. On the 
other hand, interest rate regulation is also a source of holdup power for incumbent banks (Salas & Saurina, 2003), as 
rents can be partially or completely competed away via lower rates offered by outside lenders when interest rates is 
liberalized. Besanko and Thakor (1992) find that increased competition introduced by banking deregulation erodes 
rents associated with relationship banking.
Despite the ambiguous implication of interest rate liberalization on commercial banks’ loan interest rates, we con­
trol for its potential impact by employing two dummy variables, Liberalization I and Liberalization II, to capture the two 
major steps in the process of China's interest rate liberalization process. Regression results are in Table 9, columns 
1 and 2. The two liberalization indicators obtain positive but statistically insignificant coefficients in either specifi­
cation. Our variable of interest is still the interaction term SOE x PostIPO, which receives a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient in column 2, indicating that after controlling of interest rate liberalization, SOEs still experience 
more pronounced interest rate cuts after their IPOs. Thus, the interest rate liberalization does not undercut our finding 
that interest rate decline around IPOs is the result of dissolving information monopoly.
TABLE 9 Controlling for interest rate liberalization and information asymmetry
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PostIPOijt -1.472*** -1.037* -1.701*** -1.371**
(-2.90) (-1.82) (-3.17) (-2.31)
SOEijt -18.603 -10.005
(-1.34) (-0.95)
SOEijt x PostIPOijt -1.547** -1.287*
(-1.97) (-1.69)
Liberalization Iijt 2.281 2.254
(1.23) (1.21)
Liberalization IIijt 0.158 0.166
(0.07) (0.07)
Underwriter_reputationijt 0.325 1.272
(0.42) (1.14)
Analyst_coverageijt -0.659 -2.414
(-0.12) (-0.42)
Disclosure violationijt 18.438* 13.946*
(1.88) (1.71)
Earnings qualityijt 30.301 28.492
(1.14) (1.04)
Maturityijt -1.080*** -1.088*** -0.830*** -0.838***
(-11.41) (-11.49) (-8.13) (-8.19)
Amountijt -0.232 -0.205 -0.468 -0.442
(-0.61) (-0.54) (-1.15) (-1.08)
Securedijt 3.097*** 3.075*** 3.577*** 3.551***
(7.40) (7.34) (8.17) (8.11)
Ageit - 1 -0.173 -0.160 -0.162 -0.149
(-0.40) (-0.37) (-0.35) (-0.33)
Sizeit - 1 3.397** 3.017** 4.570*** 4.275***
(2.33) (2.04) (3.02) (2.79)
ROAit - 1 -4.840 -4.285 -3.197 -2.778
(-1.51) (-1.33) (-0.99) (-0.85)
Tangibleit - 1 4.251** 4.051** 1.328 1.205
(2.28) (2.17) (0.68) (0.62)
Leverageit - 1 5.530*** 5.706*** 2.311 2.482
(2.80) (2.88) (1.12) (1.20)
Earnings volatilityi 1.101** 1.294* 12.344* 11.617
(2.07) (1.96) (1.69) (1.58)
Loan_concentrationit 1.482* 1.358 0.313 0.214
(1.79) (1.63) (0.36) (0.24)
Relationship intensityijt -0.006 0.012 0.357 0.384
(-0.01) (0.02) (0.58) (0.62)
Recessionijt 4.975*** 4.668*** 3.451* 3.061*
(Continues)
TABLE 9 (Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(3.74) (3.47) (1.95) (1.70)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 9,656 9,656 8,133 8,133
R2 0.450 0.450 0.388 0.388
Note. The dependent variable is the interest rate spread. PostIPO is equal to 1 for a loan taken after the firm's IPO. SOE is equal 
to 1 for a firm whose ultimate controlling shareholder is a local or central government. Liberalization I (Liberalization II) is equal 
to 1 for a loan is taken from October 29, 2004 to July 19, 2013 (after July 20, 2013). Underwriter reputation is measured by 
the market share of the lead underwriters; Analyst coverage is the log of 1 plus the firm's average number of financial analysts 
following the firm after its IPO; Disclosure violation is equal to 1 when a firm is criticized for or charged with information dis­
closure regulations violations by the stock exchange or the CSRC after IPO. Earnings quality is measured by abnormal accruals. 
t-Statistics are reported in parentheses.
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05 and .10 level, respectively.
4.3.5 | Controlling for information asymmetry
In this study, we interpret the decline in loan interest rates around IPOs as the result of vanishing holdup power of 
banks. An implicit assumption is in place for us to compare bank rents across SEOs versus non-SEOs: A bank's holdup 
power, if any, completely vanishes after the borrower's IPO. We acknowledge whether this assumption holds is debat­
able as stock market evidence shows varying levels of information asymmetry exist on publicly listed companies. Post­
IPO information asymmetry would limit the firm's ability to further resort to equity financing and hence erode banks’ 
holdup power (Myers & Majluf, 1984). The decline in loan interest rate thus captures only a fraction of banks’ holdup 
power that is eliminated around IPO.
To mitigate this concern, we control for firms’ information asymmetry using four variables: Underwriter reputation, 
Analyst coverage, Disclosure violation, and Earnings quality. In the book-building procedure that prevails in China's IPO 
market, investment banks acquire information about the issuer quality through due diligence as well as from informed 
investors (e.g., Benveniste & Spindt, 1989; Hanley, 1993), and more reputable underwriters produce more information 
than less reputable ones (Wang & Yung, 2011). We measure a borrower's IPO underwriter reputation using the market 
share of the lead underwriter during the IPO year (e.g., Megginson & Weiss, 1990). Analysts are important information 
producers (e.g., Frankel & Li, 2004; Hong, Lim, & Stein, 2000), and we construct the variable as the log of 1 plus the aver­
age number of analysts following a firm. Besides, post-IPO information asymmetry depends on the quality of informa­
tion disclosure by the publicly listed companies themselves, as low disclosure quality creates uncertainty about, among 
others, the credibility of financial statements (Graham, Li, & Qiu, 2008). We measure information disclosure quality by 
the following two variables. Disclosure violation is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a firm is criticized for or charged 
with violations of information disclosure regulations by the stock exchange where its stocks trade, or the CSRC in the 
[-3,3] event window. Earnings quality is measured as the change in total accruals from the previous year (e.g., DeAngelo, 
1986).
We rerun the regressions in a smaller sample where the values of these four variables are available. Table 9, columns 
3 and 4 report the results. While Underwriter reputation, Analyst coverage, and Earnings quality do not load, Disclosure 
violation obtains a positive and statistically significant coefficient. Nevertheless, they do not alter our main results. 
PostIPO and SOE x PostIPO both load negatively.Thus, after controlling for residual information asymmetry, SOEs still 
benefit more from mitigation of banks’ holdup power.
4.3.6 | Additional robustness checks
Our main variable of interest, interest rate spread, is computed relative to the benchmark interest rates set by the 
PBOC. As the PBOC may have incentives to use the benchmark rates for macro-control purposes, they may not
TABLE 10 Loan rates of the Big Four versus other banks
Whole period Pre-IPO Post-IPO Difference t-Statistic
All loans Big Four 0.293 0.656 -0.165 -0.821** -2.159
Non-Big Four -0.719 1.610 -2.774 -4.384*** -7.089
SOE loans Big Four -0.021 1.450 -2.597 -4.047*** -5.738
Non-Big Four -1.937 0.061 -4.285 -4.346*** -3.750
Non-SOE loans Big Four 0.519 -0.068 1.111 1.179*** 2.774
Non-Big Four -0.333 2.203 -2.377 -4.581*** -6.281
Note. This table compares the changes in loan interest rate spread around borrower IPOs for loans made by the Big Four banks 
and non-Big Four banks in the full sample, as well as in the subsamples of SOE loans and non-SOE loans. The Big Four refers to 
the four largest commercial banks in China controlled by the central government. Spread is measured as a percentage spread 
relative to the benchmark interest rates set by the PBOC. In each sample, the difference in the mean pre-IPO spread and post­
IPO spread is reported and tested using a t-test.
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05 and .10 level, respectively.
perfectly reflect the macroeconomic expectations. Thus, in addition to Recession, we bring in two sets of variables to 
refine our control of macroeconomic expectations: the actual growth rates in money supply M2, consumer price index, 
and gross domestic product, respectively, in the previous year; and the average expectation of growth rates of these 
metrics from the survey of economists (Gilbert, 2011). The former data are from the Wind database, while the latter 
are from the Bloomberg database. Controlling for these variables does not alter our main results.
In yet another attempt, we reestimate our baseline regressions considering firm and year two-way clustered errors 
(Cameron, Gelbach, & Miller, 2011). The coefficients of interest are still statistically significant, albeit at lower levels,11 
consistent with our H1. Tables reporting these additional robustness checks are available on request.
11 Cameron et al. (2011) and Thompson (2011) show that two-way clustering may not be suitable for data sets where N and T are very different. Our data set 
has 495 firms observed over 19-year periods.
12 The apparent increase of spreads for non-SOE loans from the Big Four banks is the result of changing firm composition pre- versus post-IPO. Out of all 
non-SOEs borrowing from the Big Four pre-IPO, 59 (or 25.2%) non-SOEs did not initiate new loans from them during the 3-year post-IPO period. In addition, 
49 (20.9%) non-SOEs that did not have loans from the Big Four borrowed from them in the post-IPO period. After controlling for loan, firm, and banking 
relationship variables, interest rate declines after IPO for loans from the Big Four banks to non-SOE borrowers, as discussed later in the section.
4.4 | The Big Four banks and information rents
We then proceed to investigate whether the Big Four banks behave differently from other banks in exploiting holdup 
power they may possess (H2). Univariate comparisons are presented in Table 10. In the full sample, loans made by the 
Big Four charge a slightly lower spread (0.821 percentage points) after the borrower IPOs, while non-Big Four banks 
lower their loan spreads by a much larger discount of 4.384 percentage points. In the subsample of SOE loans, the Big 
Four and non-Big Four banks both witness a decline in interest rate spread of about 4 percentage points. When the 
borrowers are non-SOE firms, a stark contrast arises: the Big Four banks’ percentage loan spreads on average increase 
by 1.179 percentage points,12 while those for other banks decline by 4.581 percentage points. These comparisons 
seem to suggest that the Big Four enjoy lower information rents, especially when they lend to non-SOE firms.
Table 11 reports multivariate analyses. In column 1, we run a regression that has Big4, the indicator of a loan from 
a Big Four bank, and its interaction with PostIPO as additional independent variables. PostIPO and Big4 both load neg­
atively, and their interaction term obtains a positive coefficient of 1.802 that is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
This shows overall loan rate declines after IPO, the Big Four banks charge lower rates, and the loan rate decline around 
IPO is significantly smaller for the Big Four, consistent with our hypothesis. Assuming a benchmark rate of 6%, the Big 
Four's rate decline is 13 basis points smaller than non-Big Four's.
In column 2, we add the SOE indicator, its interaction with PostIPO, and the three-way interaction SOE x Big4 x 
PostIPO to the right-hand side of the regression. The aforementioned results do not change qualitatively: PostIPO and
All firms except for
TABLE 11 Big Four banks and loan rates around IPOs
All
(1)
All
(2)
[-1,1]
(3)
Firms with one 
round of 
applications
(4)
Same-bank 
loans
(5)
SOEs with state 
ownership 
change < 0
(6)
SOEs with state 
ownership 
change < -20%
(7)
All
(8)
All
(9)
POStIPOijt -2.685*** -2.563”' -1.605 -1.571** -1.628” -2.916”' -3.055"' -2.632”' -3.222”'
(-4.27) (-3.73) (-1.47) (-2.19) (-2.00) (-4.07) (-4.28) (-3.82) (-4.49)
-1.253'” -1.374”' -1.606”' -1.188" -1.183' -2.303”' -1.939"' -1.362”' -2.123”'
(-2.68) (-2.95) (-2.93) (-2.43) (-1.73) (-4.42) (-3.78) (-2.92) (-4.13)
Big4ijt x PostlPOijt 1.802”' 2.773”' 0.497 2.075”' 0.955' 3.533"' 3.167”' 2.780'" 3.249"'
(2.94) (4.19) (1.58) (2.99) (1.77) (5.13) (5.57) (4.20) (4.66)
SOEijt -18.045 29.124' -3.885 -8.134 7.601 14.773 -18.166 -9.884
(-1.30) (1.80) (-0.29) (-0.60) (0.44) (0.87) (-1.31) (-0.94)
SOEijt x PostIPOijt 0.275 -1.903 0.954 -2.182 -3.205 0.309 0.286 0.259
(0.24) (-1.05) (0.78) (-1.41) (-1.52) (0.21) (0.25) (0.21)
SOE x Big4!jt x 
PostIPOijt
-3.195”' -1.010' -2.649" -0.462 -2.618” -5.551"' -3.171”' -2.849”'
(-3.00) (-1.67) (-2.36) (-1.31) (-2.21) (-4.07) (-2.98) (-2.59)
Loan, firm, bank_ 
relationship, and 
time variables
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Liberalization dummies No No No No No No No Yes No
Info asymmetry 
variables
No No No No No No No No Yes
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Continues)
TABLE 11 (Continued)
All
(1)
All
(2)
[-1,1]
(3)
Firms with 
one round of 
applications
(4)
All firms except for
All
(8)
All
(9)
Same-bank 
loans
(5)
SOEs with state 
ownership 
change < 0
(6)
SOEs with state 
ownership 
change < -20%
(7)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan year fixed 
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 9,656 9,610 4,612 8,760 5,875 6,984 7,664 9,610 8,097
R2 0.450 0.452 0.565 0.416 0.452 0.480 0.462 0.452 0.392
Note. The dependent variable is Spread, measured as percentage differences in loan interest rates from the benchmark interest rates. PostIPO is equal to 1 for loans taken after the borrower's 
IPO. Big4 is equal to 1 for loans made by the four largest, state-owned commercial banks. SOE is equal to 1 for a firm whose ultimate controlling shareholder is the government. Interest rate 
liberalization dummies and variables measuring information asymmetry are included in specifications (7) and (8), respectively. Loan, firm, and bank relationship characteristics as well as time 
variables are controlled for in all models. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses.
***,**,* indicate statistical significance at the .01, .05 and .10 level, respectively.
Big4 load negatively and Big4 x PostIPO loads positively. SOE x PostIPO obtains a coefficient that is not significantly 
different from zero, but SOE x Big4 x PostIPO receives a coefficient of -3.195, statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Thus, the greater bank rents SOEs suffer from are mainly from loans from the Big Four banks. Moreover, despite their 
overall lower rent extraction, the Big Four enjoy greater rents from SOEs. This indicates that SOEs’ greater information 
asymmetry outweighs the common objectives between state-owned firms and banks to provide the Big Four greater 
holdup power.
Untabulated results show that the sum of the coefficients of PostIPO, Big4, and Big4 x PostIPO is -1.164, statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Thus, when non-SOE firms borrow from the Big Four banks, the holdup problem still exists 
but is much less severe.
Columns 3-9 present robustness check results. We run the column 2 regression in alternative samples, considering 
state-ownership changes, and controlling for interest rate liberalization and post-IPO information asymmetry, and find 
qualitatively similar results in all attempts. Thus, consistent with our hypothesis, the Big Four banks appear to extract 
lower rents from holding up borrower firms. This is true especially when the borrowers are non-SOEs.
4.5 | Discussion: Alternative interpretations of loan rate declines around IPO
Loan interest rates may go lower post-IPO as the result of a decline in perceived risk of issuer firms. Pagano et al. 
(1998) and Hsu et al. (2010) point out that equity issuance lowers the issuer's debt ratio, enhances its ability to service 
existing debt, as well as raises its debt capacity. The reduced financial risk, in turn, leads to lower cost of debt. This 
effect would cause a similar decline in interest rates around IPO as the mitigation of banks’ holdup power. In all our 
prior investigations, we control for borrower firms’ financial risk using its debt-to-asset ratios and earnings volatility 
both before and after their IPOs. These two variables load positively, consistent with the positive relationship between 
financial risk and cost of credit. Untabulated comparisons show that our sample firms on average exhibit a drop in both 
debt ratios and earnings volatility post-IPO, indicating post-IPO firms do have reduced financial risk. However, these 
variables fail to subsume our mitigation of bank rents interpretation of the main results.
Underwriter reputation could exert a certification effect (e.g., Carter & Manaster, 1990), and analyst coverage fol­
lowing IPOs would lead to improved investor recognition. One can argue that both may positively contribute to IPO 
firms’ future cash flows and give rise to lower interest rates. The results in Table 9 show that our findings about bank 
rents remain intact in the presence of underwriter reputation and analyst coverage.
5 | CONCLUSION
In this paper, we empirically investigate how Chinese banks exploit their information advantage to extract rents. The­
ories suggest that information asymmetry among banks, coupled with a firm's limited nonbank financing options, 
enables an incumbent bank to hold up the borrower for higher interest rates. Since an equity IPO disseminates a large 
amount of information as well as expands financing channels for a borrower firm, it erodes the incumbent bank's holdup 
power and forces it to cut loan interest rates after the borrower's IPO. The decline in loan interest rates around a firm's 
IPO hence indicates the existence of rent extraction by the banks prior to the IPO.
As governments own some of borrower firms as well as some of the banks, China's credit market provides a unique 
laboratory to examine how state ownership influences the cost of credit. We argue that SOEs suffer from worse infor­
mation asymmetry, stemming from the separation of ownership (the public) and control (politicians) and the dual­
objective problem (both financial and social objectives). As a result, they often face higher switching costs in the credit 
market and pay higher rents to their lenders. The state-owned Big Four banks, subject to similar problems as SOEs, 
place less emphasis on information production in the lending process and hence would enjoy lower rents than their 
smaller, privately owned peers.
Using a large proprietary sample of bank loan contracts in China spanning the period from 1996 to 2014, we find 
that loan interest rate spreads (relative to the benchmark rate set by the central bank) decline after firms undertake 
their IPOs. This indicates that Chinese banks overall do hold up borrowers to extract rents, despite their lack of pricing 
capacity during most of our sample period. SOEs experience significantly larger declines in loan interest rates around 
their IPOs than non-SOE borrowers. The Big Four banks cut their loan rates by a smaller percentage than non-Big Four 
banks after the borrowers go public, and the Big Four's rate cuts concentrate on loans made to SOEs. All these results 
are consistent with our expectations and robust to a wide array of robustness checks.
Our paper represents the first attempt to understand the lending relationships confounded by government owner­
ships. It extends the existing literature of banking relationships by providing an institutional angle to view the varia­
tion in banks’ holdup power. Our findings reveal yet another implication of state ownership in business management. 
While promoting social welfare, state ownership undercuts the efficiency of both parties in the credit market in that it 
increases the cost of debt for borrowers and weakens banks’ incentives for efficient credit allocation.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1 Controllers of banks in China
(Continues)
Bank name Bank type Actual controller
Bank of China Big Four Ministry of Finance (Through Central Huijin 
Investment Co.)
Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China
Big Four Ministry of Finance (Through Central Huijin 
Investment Co.)
Agricultural Bank of China Big Four Ministry of Finance (Through Central Huijin 
Investment Co.)
China Construction Bank Big Four Ministry of Finance (Through Central Huijin 
Investment Co.)
China Merchants Non-Big Four China Merchants Group
Shanghai Pudong Development 
Bank
Non-Big Four State Asset Supervision and Administration 
Commission of Shanghai
China Everbright Bank Non-Big Four Central Huijin Investment Co.
Industrial Bank Non-Big Four State Asset Supervision and Administration 
Commission of Fujian
Huaxia Bank Non-Big Four State Asset Supervision and Administration 
Commission of Beijing
TABLE A1 (Continued)
Bank name Bank type Actual controller
China Guangfa Bank Non-Big Four State Asset Supervision and Administration 
Commission of Guangdong
China Bohai Bank Non-Big Four State Asset Supervision and Administration 
Commission of Tianjin
Bank of Communications Non-Big Four No actual controller
China Citic Bank Non-Big Four No actual controller
PingAn Bank Non-Big Four No actual controller
China Zheshang Bank Non-Big Four No actual controller
Hengfeng Bank Non-Big Four No actual controller
China Minsheng Bank Non-Big Four No actual controller
City Commercial Banks Non-Big Four Urban enterprises, citizens, or local governments
Note. This table discloses the ultimate controllers of commercial banks in China since 2004 when the Big Four banks first listed 
on domestic and Hong Kong stock exchanges.
Sources: Banks’ annual financial reports, CSMAR, and Bankscope databases.
TABLE A2 Loan distributions in our sample
Panel A: Distribution of loan transactions
Full sample Pre-IPO Post-IPO
Transactions Percent Transactions Percent Transactions Percent
SOE Big4 2,673 72.44% 1,701 76.11% 972 66.80%
Non-Big4 1,017 27.56% 534 23.89% 483 33.20%
Total 3,690 100% 2,235 100% 1,455 100%
Non-SOE Big4 3,719 54.27% 1,866 57.31% 1,853 51.52%
Non-Big4 3,134 45.73% 1,390 42.69% 1,744 48.48%
Total 6,853 100% 3,256 100% 3,597 100%
Panel B: Distribution of loan amount
Full sample Pre-IPO Post-IPO
Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent
SOE Big4 3,038.18 69.10% 1,682.82 73.79% 1,355.35 64.05%
Non-Big4 1,358.55 30.90% 597.834 26.21% 760.71 35.95%
Total 4,396.73 100% 2,280.66 100% 2,116.07 100%
Non-SOE Big4 4,644.36 53.82% 2,235.86 56.05% 2,408.50 51.90%
Non-Big4 3,985.44 46.18% 1,753.39 43.95% 2,232.05 48.10%
Total 8,629.81 100% 3,989.25 100% 4,640.55 100%
Note. This table shows the shares of different lenders (Big Four vs. others) and borrowers (SOE and non-SOE) in our sample. 
Panels A and B present the distributions in loan transactions and loan amount, respectively.
TABLE A3 Change in ownership structure around IPO
Panel A: Change of the ultimate controller around IPO
Period relative to IPO date (years)
New state 
controller
No. of 
firms[-1,1] [0, 3]
SOE 0 4 4 150
Non-SOE 0 3 0 345
All 0 7 4 495
Panel B: Changes in state ownership for SOEs around IPO
State ownership pre-IPO
Range of change <50% [50%, 90%] >90% All
[0, 100%] 20 0 0 20
[-20%, 0] 13 21 2 36
[-40%,-20%] 3 25 51 79
[-100%,-40%] 0 5 10 15
Note. Panel A shows the number of firms whose ultimate controller has changed around IPO. Panel B shows the changes in 
state ownership for SOEs around IPO.
Sources: CSMAR database, Wind database, and firms’ prospectuses and annual reports.
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